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Abstract 
The question of time is a cornerstone in feminist theory because the specificity of our time is its 
illegitimate foreclosure of temporal possibilities. In this paper, I try to thematize the specificity of 
this illegitimacy by first developing an account of time as messianic, which takes into account the 
entanglement of the feminist salvatory work and its foreclosure. Such an account of time calls for 
the question of the modalities and the structures upon which this unfolding hinges; I am mostly 
interested in the structure of language. Two approaches to the linguistic retrieval of the lost time 
are addressed in my paper; the deconstructive approach in Derrida’s “Force of Law,” and the 
archaeological approach in Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language. Deconstruction claims that 
the unfolding of time may never be outstripped by the power of language because of the aporetic 
structure of representation of language. Although Kristeva agrees with this point, her 
archeological framework nonetheless acknowledges that the symbolic order of language must 
represent a horizon for the feminist revolutionary work. To a stronger extent, I will try to show 
through Kristeva that there is a partial repudiation of language’s timely power in Derrida’s 
understanding of the place of the symbolic and representation in deconstruction. The power of 
language may instead be accounted for through the mode of production of meaning in language 
for Kristeva, which must take into consideration the structures of subject formation through 
psychoanalysis.  
 
Keywords: temporality, messianic time, deconstruction, archaeology, language, law, justice, 
Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva  
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1. Introduction 
This paper is mainly interested in reconceiving the question of time in feminist theory. More 
specifically, I work at developing a messianic account of time in order to better understand how 
time structures and orchestrates the “feminist revolution.” However, such an account of time may 
find itself at odds with other feminist accounts. Hence, I first want to go through a brief history of 
the outlook on time.1 In short, the first wave of feminism works at giving similar opportunities to 
women that are given to man, which boils down to inserting the feminine experience in the 
forcible and linear temporality of the paternal law. Ultimately, this maintains an uncritical 
approach to temporality. Second wave feminism, on the other hand, rejects the paternal 
temporality in the name of the institution of a feminine “cyclical” or “embodied” time. This 
second wave represents a bigger challenge because it begs the question of the legitimacy of 
institutions and of the essence of the feminine experience. Indeed, these feminists defend their 
revolutionary position by grounding it in concepts like the “feminine experience” or the 
“feminine body,” which are considered more stable and legitimate footing for revolution. By 
doing so, they however tacitly essentialize and enclose the feminine experience in a specific 
revolutionary signifier, namely “embodiment” or “cyclical time.” Ultimately, second wave 
feminism falls short of providing a critical account of language through which this timely 
revolution may be articulated2 without falling into a metaphysical domain of language, unhinged 
and disconnected from experience.  
These critical expositions stage a third approach with regards to the question of time. 
Indeed, third wave feminism takes neither time nor language as a stable and certain ground for a 
feminist revolution. On the contrary, post-structuralist thought has specifically worked at 
thematizing these metaphysical tendencies of language that disconnect it from experience and 
essentialize its revolutionary aim. Language, by itself, runs the risk of disconnecting from the 
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very experience it sets out to articulate and reveals itself as unstable and dubious with regards to 
its revolutionary signifier. Hence, language rather accomplishes its revolutionary aim through the 
mode of retrieval of lost time by language, and not in the content of the language itself. The 
analysis of time will hence allow us to account for this instability and flexibility of language in 
order to achieve the revolutionary feminist aim. Furthermore, the specificity of the paternal law, 
against which feminist theory posits itself, is its illegitimate foreclosure of temporal possibilities. 
Indeed, feminist revolution must work at releasing these temporal possibilities while also 
acknowledging the fundamental impossibility of that claim. Ultimately, the analysis of time and 
revolution in the context of French feminist theory will lead to a theory of revolt, this is to say a 
theory that acknowledges the impervious character of language with regards to time and the 
subsequent intimacy of the temporal modalities of revolution. In order to do so, Jacques Derrida’s 
text “Force of Law” (1992) and Julia Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language (1974) prove to 
be especially helpful, because they provide insight both on the question of time and on the 
question of the legitimacy of revolution.  
First, I am interested in Derrida’s messianic account of time as a yet-to-come (à-venir) in 
“Force of Law.” In this text, Derrida renders and rearticulates two concepts from Walter 
Benjamin’s Critique of Violence: law-preserving violence and law-founding violence. By doing 
so, Derrida works at developing an account of justice that may not outstrip the analysis of law at 
work in the structuring of our world while also being law’s conditions of possibility. This 
aporetic structure of law withdraws justice in a yet-to-come dimension of laws and a messianic 
structure of manifestation. Furthermore, the mode of retrieval of this lost “just” time is 
deconstructive. Indeed, deconstruction acknowledges this undecipherable and unreadable 
dimension of laws with regards to their judicial aim while also working at fleshing out the 
illegitimate and metaphysical pretentions of laws. Then, to deepen and radicalize the idea of 
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messianic time, I turn to Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language (1974), her most 
straightforward exposition of the semiotic and symbolic order of language. In order to understand 
the interaction of both these dimensions, we must first understand the structures of subject-
formation. Indeed, in order for the semiotic to make its way to the symbolic, the subject must 
accept and assume its position as a fundamental lack. However, this position may only be fully 
assumed through metaphorical and unstable processes, withdrawing the retrieval of lost time to a 
messianic dimension. The retrieval, in turns, is archaeological because it follows the horizon of 
the arché of subject-formation through psychoanalysis.3 This point will be further reinforced 
through later texts by Kristeva, namely Powers of Horror (1980). In this text, Kristeva addresses 
the question of the agency of the subject with regards to its own subject-formation and she 
reconceptualises the semiotic dimension of language as a bodily limit. This will further our point 
on the intimacy of revolution and reaffirm the paramount importance of the symbolic order in 
articulating the feminist revolution.  
Furthermore, Kristeva reveals in Revolution in Poetic Language that the retrieval of lost 
time may only be articulated through language – a point that will also be addressed in Derrida’s 
“Force of Law” (1992) and Positions (1974). Indeed, for Kristeva, the unfolding of time may 
only be accounted for in linguistic terms and, alternatively, language finds its essential aim 
through the accomplishment of a temporal revolution. French post-structuralism has thematized 
the problem of the linguistic retrieval of lost time and the differences between deconstructive and 
archaeological approaches on the question of this retrieval. What I aim to show is that at stake in 
the debate between the archaeological and the deconstructive approaches is the very status of the 
symbolic order of language and its representability. Considering this, my main goal in 
challenging Derrida’s account of messianic time with Kristeva’s framework of language is to 
reaffirm the importance of language as a symbolic order in the philosophy of time and as central 
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in operating the timely/awaited revolution in feminist philosophy. In other words, if we are to 
accept that the specificity of paternal law lies in its foreclosure of temporal possibilities, we 
should also accept that the feminist revolution must partly hinge on the symbolic order that 
instituted this law – or at least represents a horizon for feminist analysis. 
 
2. Messianic Time and Deconstruction in Derrida’s “Force of Law” 
I first want to turn to Derrida to deepen our understanding of the metaphysical pitfalls of 
language and develop a messianic account of time in “Force of Law.”4 In the second section of 
this essay, Derrida introduces two concepts, which he borrows from Walter Benjamin’s Critique 
of Violence: law-founding violence and law-preserving violence. In short, the founding violence 
is the one that institutes and positions law (die rechtsetzende Gewalt) and the violence that 
conserves is the one that maintains, confirms, insures the permanence and enforceability of the 
law (die rechtserhaltende Gewalt) (Derrida 1993, 31). However, these can only be virtually5 
differentiated precisely because, on the one hand, a law is powerless if it is founded but never 
enforced and, on the other hand, a law is fundamentally tyrannical if it is enforced but never 
properly founded6 (16). In order to show the very entanglement of these two violences at work in 
laws – or “différantielle contamination” as coined by Derrida – I will make two points. First, the 
claim of laws in their founding moment goes above and beyond the very scope of the laws in a 
quasi-ahistorical manner, withdrawing justice in an ungraspable dimension. Second, the 
reiterative structure of laws not only cheapens the founding of law, but it destabilizes and renders 
ineffective any possibility to develop permanent and proper channels (passage) to justice. The 
possibility of deconstruction lies at the intersection of the quasi-ahistorical, and the specific and 
experiential dimension of laws. Ultimately, I will address the articulation of difference between 
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the deconstructive work as foundation, and the symbolic order and the representative object it 
must hinge on.   
2.1 Laws and the aporia of justice 
In order to understand the (un)graspable status of justice, we must first understand the status of 
laws themselves. Indeed, I have mentioned that the analysis of justice may never outstrip the 
analysis of laws, precisely because laws are essentially established as such through monopoly. 
Derrida writes, “the monopoly doesn’t strive for any given just and legal ends […] but law 
itself.” (33) This is to say, it is not the content of the laws that should be scrutinized in order to 
seek out a just end, it should rather be the status of the laws as monopoly. Indeed, the violence of 
law is precisely its claim to the monopoly of violence and world-structuring (Gewalt); the very 
existence of a law is an absolute – and hence violent – claim on the world. This does not mean 
that laws are inherently tyrannical, but rather that there is nothing outside of laws and their world-
structuring violence upon which laws may ground themselves to insure their own enforcement 
and permanence. Furthermore, the foundational violence of the law is also a claim on time; 
although contingently positioned in time, the foundation of a law is always and must always be 
an a-historical claim. Indeed, as Derrida puts it, the “founding or revolutionary moment of law is, 
in law, an instance of non-law. But it is also the whole of history. This moment always takes 
place and never takes place in the presence.” (36) In this excerpt, Derrida reveals not only that 
the foundation of the law in a quasi-ahistorical claim, but also – and most importantly – that this 
timely dimension of the law is precisely what deems it ungraspable. Indeed, “there is this 
question of this ungraspable revolutionary instant that belongs to no historical, temporal 
continuum but in which the foundation of a new law nevertheless plays, if we may say so, on 
something from an anterior law.” (40-1) The very ungraspability or unreadability of the violence 
of the law lies in the twofold status it has with regard to time. On the one hand, the founding 
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violence of the law posits itself outside of the realm of laws and readability altogether. In other 
words, this founding violence is before the law and anterior to the law.7 On the other hand, this 
timeless dimension of laws may only arise in a specific legal context and builds upon anterior 
laws. In other words, this founding violence is indebted to its prior laws. Hence, paradoxically, in 
the instant of revolution, the law posits itself beyond the law – an “instance of non-law” – and 
claims more than what can be claimed by a law, while also building off pre-existing contingent 
laws. As a matter of fact, if the founding violence were strictly ungraspable, it would be 
graspable as ungraspable. What renders the founding of the law ungraspable is its perpetually 
aborted graspability. Derrida writes, the “unreadability of violence results from the very 
readability of the violence that belongs to what others would call the symbolic order of law.” (37) 
This fundamentally means that the justice at work in laws must always be played out in this 
(un)graspable dimension of laws, withdrawn from time and presence.8  
However, the founding violence of the law does not disconnect the legal field from any critical 
work, nor does it entail that the just end of laws shall be carried through clear and identifiable 
channels. Indeed, the law-preserving violence, through its reiterative structure, undermines any 
work to establish a proper connection between laws and justice, to the extent where justice may 
never manifest as such at all times within laws. More specifically, this means that a specific 
concept never encapsulates the salvatory power of justice. On the contrary, Derrida argues “we 
are in the realm where, in the end, there are only singular examples.” (29) Indeed, an analysis of 
laws towards a just end may only be carried out in specific experience and through singular 
examples. This analysis must experience the very limit of the singular example of the specific 
laws at work in this context, in order for justice to properly manifest. In other words, it is only in 
the specific legal experience that the ahistorical field of justice reveals itself as such. Again, this 
ahistorical field of justice remains fundamentally indebted to the singular context within which it 
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arose9 and may never posit itself as having reached justice as a pure concept: “nothing is 
absolutely exemplary,” Derrida writes.10 At stake in this aporetic structure between specific legal 
examples and the generality and ahistoriality of justice is the very accomplishing of justice. 
Furthermore, Derrida writes, “justice is an experience of the impossible” (16). In order for justice 
to be effectively experienced, justice must first and foremost be experienced at the very limit of 
experience. This limit is precisely the infinity and groundlessness of justice as a timeless concept. 
However, the limit experience is precisely what cannot be experienced as such; justice is the 
impossible experience of the impossible. Indeed, the structure of experience itself prohibits the 
timeless experience of justice and keeps justice at an (un)graspable distance. Again, experience 
may not be the ground for justice to arise precisely because experience may only be accounted 
for within specific legal terms. This also begs the question of the institution and the specific legal 
context of the aporetic experience of justice. Derrida writes,  
We are dealing with a double bind […]. On the one hand, it appears easier to criticize the 
violence that founds since it cannot be justified by any pre-existing legality and so appears 
savage. But on the other hand, and this reversal is the whole point of this reflection, it is 
more difficult, more illegitimate to criticize this same violence since one cannot summon it 
to appear before the institution of any pre-existing law. (40) 
 
The criticism of laws seems easier when directed to their foundational violence because it is 
untethered and hence uncomplicated. This hasty criticism, however, bypasses the essential 
institutions through which justice has historically been served. On the other hand, it is more 
difficult but also more illegitimate to criticize justice on the grounds of the historical legal 
institutions precisely because one cannot summon justice “to appear before the institution of any 
pre-existing law.” The point here, again, is the indistinguishable difference between the criticism 
of laws and the accomplishment of justice through legal institutions.11 Hence, the timely 
(im)possibility of justice is twofold. First, it is impossible for any legal channels of justice to 
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reinstitute themselves and to perpetrate through time. Second, it is impossible for any legal 
channels of justice to fully grasp justice within laws of all times at any given time. The work that 
is set out within this double (im)possibility of timely justice is deconstruction. The deconstructive 
work fundamentally seeks out these ever-changing channels of justice within legal experience. 
Also, the deconstructive work “has no horizon of expectation” (27),12 precisely because it may 
not rely upon any salvatory/ revolutionary concept – i.e., justice. The heterogeneity of justice and 
experience renders any horizon to the deconstructive work dubious and unstable. Rather, 
deconstruction may only be accounted work through differential work.  
 
2.2 Différantielle contamination 
Derrida’s concept of différantielle contamination (38) points to the very entanglement of the 
founding violence and preserving violence at work in law. As we have explained before, the law 
positions itself in a foundational act that goes beyond the scope of the law. This founding of the 
law is both contingent, as it is a positioning between an array of “possibilities,” and necessary, as 
it positions itself upon experience and obliterates any other “possibilities.” Derrida has proven 
once and for all that the reiterative structure of time cannot be the source of the forceful 
enforcement13 of the law and, alternatively, a critical analysis of justice may not do away with 
this reiterative structure. Considering this, the claim of différantielle contamination is twofold. 
First, (1) the work laid out for deconstruction is the one of differentiating two dimensions of law 
that are fundamentally indistinguishable. It is only in this differentiating that the structures of law 
find their foundation. Second, (2) a thorough overthrow of the law may only be deferred, this is 
to say it may only be accomplished in a place beyond the law and in a time that is not ours. 
Ultimately, the claim of différantielle contamination is not that the aim of justice is strictly 
impossible in itself. Rather, the claim of différance is that the fundamental work of laws may 
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only be accomplished in a messianic dimension of time, manifesting itself in the mode of a yet-
to-come: “Justice remains, is yet to come, à venir, it has an, it is à venir, the very dimension of 
events irreducibly to come.”14 (27) If we have understood the radicalism of the differantial 
(im)possibility and the symbolic unstability of deconstruction, it should also be clear that the 
(un)graspable concept of justice is nothing but its timely and messianic unfolding. Indeed, in 
“Force of Law,” language is not a productive limit to time,15 although it may participate in the 
unfolding of time. In other words, although language is an important factor in the unfolding of 
time, it does not hold an equivalent status as time. The necessary implication of this interaction of 
time and language is, as Derrida underlines through the voice of Benjamin, “to recognize […] a 
pure and revolutionary violence as such, is a decision not accessible to man. [sic]”16 (55) 
 
2.3 Representation and the symbolic order of language 
In this line of questioning, we may ask if the violence of law can be boiled down to the violence 
of symbolic representation of language. Derrida posits, “the concept of violence belongs to the 
symbolic order of law, politics and morals. And it is only to that extent that it can give rise to a 
critique.” (33) What is striking in this excerpt is that, for Derrida, the whole of violence is 
attributable to the symbolic order and not just the preservation of the law. Hence, to anticipate, 
there does not seem to be a perfect equivalency between law founding/preserving and 
semiotic/symbolic dimensions of language in Kristeva. Furthermore, the “unreadability of 
violence results from the very readability of the violence that belongs to what others would call 
the symbolic order of law.” (37) Conceptualizing the preservation of law as its pure readability 
through the symbolic order is, according to Derrida, erasing the fact that readability is always co-
extensively unreadability.17 In other words, the claim of the symbolic to any sort of logic or any 
sort of readability is hence unstable. For Derrida, the symbolic itself inaugurates the unavoidable 
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violence; the symbolic is the readability that makes the unreadability necessary and 
unsurpassable. The symbolic, just like justice, amounts to an aporia that may never be surpassed. 
This disavowal of the pure symbolic objects of language as proper channels of justice has, in my 
opinion, two main consequences. First, it repudiates and disconnects any sort of symbolic 
analysis from a pre-symbolic transformation as given. This would mean, for example, that a 
revolution or destruction of the paternal law would not have anything to do with the analysis of 
the signifiers at work in the symbolic order of the paternal law. Second, it disqualifies the 
existence of any transcendental signifiers or signified in language. These signifiers are, according 
to Derrida, dubious grounds for any kind of revolution and would rather bolster the metaphysical 
pretentiousness of such symbolic analysis. Hence, this limits the critical outreach of 
deconstruction to the fleshing out of illegitimate application of metaphysical “concepts” to non-
metaphysical “objects.”18 Moreover, on the question of language, Derrida rather shifts his focus 
on presence and representation in order to avoid this problem of the symbolic. He writes: 
Without being immediately present, [the violence that founds droit] is replaced (vertreten, 
‘represented’) by the supplement of a substitute. And it is in this différance, in the 
movement that replaces presence […], it is in this différantielle representativity that 
originary violence is consigned to oblivion. This amnesic loss of consciousness does not 
happen by accident. It is the very passage from presence to representation. (47) 
 
Hence, representativity is for Derrida the problem of the originary and unsurpassable violence. 
The symbolic order that encapsulates representativity may not be outstripped by another 
dimension of language, precisely because nothing escapes representativity. Rather, the gap 
between presence and representativity inscribes différance at the very center of both presence and 
representativity.19 Representation is not simply a doubling of the presence, it is the very distance 
that allows presence to be (un)graspable and (un)readable, this is to say the proper distance that 
allows presence to be experienced as such. Furthermore, the objects of language may never be 
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present as such and immediately, but rather always deferred through representation. The presence 
prior to representation is forever lost in oblivion, albeit always immediately present in 
representation as its mystical authority. This différantial structure ultimately allows Derrida to 
evacuate the question of subjectivity from the problem of the possibility of deconstruction.  
 
3. Kristeva’s Archaeology and the Instability of the Semiotic-Symbolic 
My goal in this section is to deepen our understanding of Kristeva’s archaeological process of 
time by further exploring the logic of the interaction of the symbolic and the semiotic dimensions 
of language. I will first attend to this through Kristeva’s early text Revolution in Poetic Language 
as an introduction to the openness of language and its modalities of transformation. This text is 
also Kristeva’s first clear distancing from Lacan’s theory of the symbolic unconscious and a 
return to Freud’s theory of drives. I will then briefly explore her later understanding of the 
modalities of transformation of language – and subsequent subjectivities – in Powers of Horror 
and “Women’s Time,” and address the shift from revolution to revolt. As mentioned before, 
Kristeva’s account of language attempts to give voice to something “outside” the realm of the 
symbolic functioning, and so outside of the given structure of meaning and “values” 
(Beardsworth 2004, 42). In Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva defends that the 
inauguration of the symbolic order of language can only be carried out through a necessary 
separation between the subject and its primary bodily drives, what she calls the “thetic phase” 
(Kristeva 1984, 43-6). The thetic phase is hence the necessary separation in order for a “subject” 
and an “object” to appear as such and consequently, an enunciation and an identification of the 
subject with these objects to be possible. The thetic phase implies both a rupturing of the pre-
verbal subject and its drives, and is what allows the subject to build and produce a self-
identification through its enunciation and object-relations. Interestingly, enunciations may only 
Maxime Varin 14 
refer to or represent their objects through specific meaning production – namely through 
metaphors or metonymies. However, the thetic phase itself precedes logically as the virtual fact 
of attribution of meaning to objects by the subject. Hence, the thetic phase may not be a strictly 
symbolic apparatus – like the mirror stage might be for Lacan, for example20 – precisely because 
it logically precedes meaning production, which draws upon both symbolic and semiotic 
dimensions of language. We could say that the thetic phase may only manifest itself as a virtual 
presence in our meaningful world, which leads Kristeva to refer to it as the “deepest structure of 
enunciation” (42). Furthermore, Kristeva will argue that modern philosophy has exclusively 
worked at developing an account of representation – and consequently of the inauguration of 
meaning – from the standpoint of the transcendental ego. Freud, however, breaks with this 
tradition by shifting his focus away from the origin of the inauguration – which can only amount 
to the impossibility of the subject of escaping the symbolic it has itself inaugurated, in a Lacanian 
manner – and redirect it to the modes of production of that very meaning – where something 
above and beyond the subject may be found (43).  
 
3.1 Castration and the Metaphorical Dimension of Language 
In the Freudian theory, the mirror stage and castration are both moments that instantiate this 
overarching power of the thetic phase between the symbolic consciousness and the unconscious 
drives; and they may be the key into the mode of production of meaning itself. Castration is 
neither the history of a particular subject relative to its own experience  – and a relic of Freud’s 
sexist past – nor is it the definite enclosing of the subject under the phallic signifier – and the 
inauguration of the symbolic order of the paternal law. Rather, castration holds a twofold status 
with regards to meaning production; it is both (1) a specific metaphor for the fundamental lack at 
the origin of the meaning production, and (2) in itself is the sole introduction into the symbolic 
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order it institutionalizes. This double status is inscribed in the very ambiguity of the thetic phase: 
Kristeva will say that it is both an “a priori supposition,” and a “logical necessity” as well as an 
“imaginary construction” (Kristeva 1981, 22-3). Hence, castration for Freud is the completion 
and the fulfillment of this separation (Kristeva 1984, 44); it is the necessary tipping over of the 
subject into its symbolic, while also staying entirely dependent upon metaphoric castration. In 
other words, castration is the necessary metaphor for the lack. The metaphoric representation of 
that lack through the fear of castration inscribes for the subject the lack as being fundamentally 
and solely a lack of the phallus and consequently inscribes the phallus as the empty signifier of 
the symbolic order. We must not forget that for Freud and for Kristeva, the signifier at the origin 
of the symbolic order metaphorically finds its foundation in a pre-symbolic and unthematizable 
dimension of experience of lack and, hence, draws its meaning partly from a semiotic dimension 
of language.  
The discovery of castration, however, detaches the subject from his dependence on the 
mother, and the perception of this lack [manque] makes the phallic function a symbolic 
function—the symbolic function. This is a decisive moment, fraught with consequences: 
the subject, finding his identity in the symbolic, separates from his fusion with the 
mother, confines his jouissance to the genital, and transfers semiotic motility onto the 
symbolic order. (45) 
 
Hence, the symbolic is not a burden to the semiotic expression or vice versa; rather, it is the 
boundary and the limit where meaning is produced. The splitting of the thetic phase has been 
revealed as the very condition of possibility of signification itself. The thetic phase, as the 
condition of possibility of significance, hence reveals a transcendental dimension of language 
(48). However, precisely because this dimension of language may only be revealed at the limit, or 
can only be revealed metaphorically, the thetic phase may only transcendentally reach out in a 
partial manner, with a remainder. In other words, in coping with the metaphoricity of language, 
the status of the thetic phase forever remains quasi-transcendental. Kristeva puts it in the form of 
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a question “is this to say, then, that such a theoretical undertaking transcendentalizes semiotic 
motility, setting it up as a transcendental Signifier?” (46)  
Furthermore, the resulting subject of this newfound symbolic order will be, as Kristeva puts it, 
absent. Indeed, with regards to the manifestation of the semiotic motility in the symbolic order, 
the subject may only fill a space that is fundamentally absent and empty, or rather, that has 
fundamentally assumed its emptiness. We have seen previously that the fundamental lack may 
only manifest itself to the subject through a metaphor or a metonymy, namely castration. 
Castration fills both a transcendental and a specific position in the subject formation. However, 
the pre-Oedipal drives, albeit analytically unthinkable, remain operating for the subject, precisely 
because they fuel its signification-production. In order for these drives to find some kind of 
accomplishment, Kristeva will argue that the subject must assume its fundamental lack and must 
consolidate the castration trauma,21 and a failure to do so might result in excessive fantasy or 
psychosis. In other words, the libidinal energy transmitted to the subject as pre-Oedipal drives 
may turn against the subject and become a destructive force of the subject (as psychosis, etc.) if 
the castration complex was only partially inscribed unto the subject, which in turn fundamentally 
implies that the castration must have been fundamentally experienced as a problem, as a trauma, 
as a drama (49). This is the space opened up to the subject to transform destructive and reactive 
forces into productive ones:  
This is the crux of the matter: […] the completion of the Oedipus complex [is] needed 
for the Aufhebung [relève] of the semiotic in the symbolic to give rise to a signifying 
practice that has a socio-historical function (and is not just a self-analytical discourse, 
a substitute for the analyst's couch) (49) 
 
Kristeva reaffirms in this excerpt the necessity for the Oedipus complex to be completed – and 
hence experienced as problematic and as revealing the fundamental lack – to be effective in 
concerting subjectivity as absent and allowing signification to arise. She goes a step further; at 
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stake in the thesis of the semiotic dimension of language is the very possibility of language to 
reach out to something like reality and enact transformation – in its limited outreach.22 In short, 
the thesis of the semiotic is necessary for significance; losing sight of the semiotic is also losing 
sight of the possibility for language to deliver anything practical, transformative and significant. 
It is also interesting to notice that, for Kristeva, the Oedipus complex is not released in an 
identifiable and discreet moment in the psyche’s history,23 but must rather be reaffirmed in every 
meaning-production practice. Hence, Kristeva’s thought converges in this very aim: the 
possibility of meaning-production practice to have a “socio-historical function,” a fundamentally 
ethico-political aim.24 Indeed, the analysis of the subject as absent has opened up a political space 
within significance, however virtual it is. The political agency of the subject, however, does not 
directly regard significance production – as liberal subjects would assume – but rather regards the 
position of the subject in the process of significance production.25 In other words, it is within the 
agency of the subject to unlock historical possibilities that have been foreclosed by narcissism 
and the bolstering of the ego in Western thought. Before getting into the finer details of the 
political and historical aspects of Kristeva’s thought as well as its interaction/contradictions with 




Mimesis for Kristeva is first a repetitive structure of language, but is foremost a weakening and a 
dissolving of the structures of the symbolic and semiotic by effectively instating the thetic phase 
of language as a mere virtual presence and preventing the thetic from becoming “theological” or 
“unitary” (58). The aim of Kristeva’s argument on mimesis is the fundamental “figurability” of 
language (60), which is to say the very plasticity and malleability of language with regards to the 
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transcendental dimension of the thetic. In a similar manner to repetition, mimesis is a 
fundamental structure of the symbolic dimension of language. As clarified above, the denotative 
function of language has been revealed as one fulfilled solely through metaphors and 
metonymies. On the one hand, the syntactic form of denotation as metaphor and metonymy 
makes up for the very unpredictability and unfigurability of this linguistic function. Indeed, if 
language is to rely upon a semiotic dimension – which is to say an “outside” and unpredictable 
dimension – then its syntactic structure of meaning-production may not be fixed and stable. On 
the other hand, mimesis also shakes the core of subjectivity as lack. Indeed, we have found that 
subjectivity as well is consolidated in the metaphorical identification with lack through castration. 
Castration, in order words, may only enact its power upon the subject through metaphorical and 
unstable grounds. Mimesis cheapens/displaces the very identification of the subject with lack and 
hence jeopardizes the blooming of the pre-Oedipal drives through the subject.26 This point is a 
paramount one: mimesis reveals not only the unstable basis of the expression of drives, but 
further reveals that the expression of these drives is nothing but the underlying syntax – 
metaphors and metonymies – that allows their expression. In Kristeva’s words, “we find the 
principles of metonymy and metaphor indissociable from the drive economy underlying them.” 
(28) Again, the possibility of the expression of pre-Oedipal drives does not precede the syntax 
that allowed them to be, rather they are the syntactic structure in themselves, “the inseparability 
of the thetic and syntax” (55). Indeed, for the subject, the expression of drives always manifests 
itself as such… or as such… The motility of the very object of drives forces us to latch onto the 
symbolic object of these drives (e.g., the fascination for the phallus27) as well as keeping a 
fundamental flexibility and plasticity with regards to future objects of libidinal expression (the 
Phallus). Both approaches are necessary for and co-extensive in the completion of drives, and for 
that we must not think them as contradictory. Hence, demystifying the semiotic dimension of 
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language and the pre-Oedipal drives implies necessarily to both embrace the fundamental 
relativity of the object of the drive for the subject, and to recognize the transcendental thetic 
function of language which locates the symbolic object of drives. This is why Kristeva argues 
that mimesis both works at maintaining and at subverting the unity of the thetic (60), it is both the 
enemy of language and its only resource. Mimesis, then, paradoxically participates in the 
figurability of language, what Kristeva calls poetic language. Poetic language is the propensity of 
language to go above and beyond its mimetic repetition as well as use mimesis to achieve its 
linguistic aim. 
Furthermore, the mimetic structure of language forecloses the possibility of any pure 
signifier and rejects any possibility of language to definitely accomplish it revolutionary aim.  
Kristeva writes, “to note that there can be no language without a thetic phase that establishes the 
possibility of truth, and to draw consequences from this discovery is quite a different matter from 
insisting that every signifying practice operates uniquely out of the thetic phase.” (59) Indeed, the 
thetic phase has been recognized as fundamental for signification, but its presence has also been 
revealed as virtual by mimesis. This fundamentally means that its power is never instantiated in a 
single and unitary signifier, and as well is never released in a definite and discreet moment in 
time. In other words, the revolution may never be encapsulated in a single signifying object – e.g. 
the body, the Mother, God, language, etc. On the contrary, the idea of a pure revolutionary 
signifier distances us from the actual revolutionary aim, which is “a signifying practice that has a 
socio-historical function.” Chiefly, Kristeva argues that every signifying act both (1) is 
fundamentally possible because of the thetic phase and (2) is one that never fully reaches out and 
accomplishes the revolutionary aim of the thetic phase. This double bind of the thetic phase 
renders its presence as only virtual in language, a “theoretical supposition” (67). She goes on, “no 
pure signifier can effect the Aufhebung (in the Hegelian sense) [relève] of the semiotic without 
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leaving a remainder [reste]” (49). The condition of possibility of significance and meaning is the 
existence of an outside dimension to language; the semiotic. However, the very unpredictability 
and unfigurability of the semiotic forecloses any possibility for language to fully grasp it and 
hence enact a full-fledged socio-historical revolution, and leaves language in a double bind with 
regards to its own signifying power. The “remainder” of the semiotic may only virtually appear 
in significance as a “trace” or a “reste.”  
 
4. Derrida against Kristeva 
The point Kristeva makes through mimesis is similar to Derrida’s previous point on différantielle 
contamination. Indeed, the double bind of the law with regards to justice might easily be 
paralleled with the double bind of significance with regards to the semiotic dimension of 
language. Justice, for Derrida, is an (un)graspable concept at work in laws without ever actually 
manifesting within laws. The presence of justice, just like the presence of other metaphysical 
entities like deconstruction or democracy, may only make its way to laws by the messianic 
structure of time. Significance for Kristeva also follows a thoroughly messianic structure of time. 
Indeed, the mimetic structure of language has revealed that the semiotic dimension of language 
may only make its way into the symbolic order as the releasing by the subject of pre-Oedipal 
drives. Significance may never fully rely upon the semiotic dimension of language in order to 
fully reach out to its object. Hence, revolution – i.e., the retrieval of lost time by significance28 – 
is never fully completed and always to come.  
 
4.1 Deconstruction and Archaeology  
However, along the exposure of the concept of language, a “transcendental” dimension of 
language in the thetic phase as well as an ethical and a political space of subjectivity have been 
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shown to underpin the linguistic double bind of significance. Indeed, for Kristeva, the very 
possibility of significance hinges both (1) on a radically exterior dimension of language and (2) a 
fundamentally figurable and transcendental dimension of language, without which we lose the 
very possibility of language to signify. Hence, a considerable difference remains between 
Kristeva’s approach to language in Revolution in Poetic Language and Derrida’s approach to 
justice in “Force of Law” regarding the mode of retrieval of lost time within language. On the one 
hand, Derrida’s approach to the retrieval of lost time is deconstructive. For Derrida, asking the 
question of the mode of retrieval is asking the question of the media within which this retrieval is 
(im)possible. Unsurprisingly, he underlines a paradox on this question. First, (1) justice “is 
required immediately” (Derrida 1993, 26), which means that every situation asks for an 
immediate just decision. Second, (2) a just decision has no horizon. Indeed, it is precisely because 
of this “overflowing of the performative, because of this always excessive haste to interpretation 
getting ahead of itself, because of this structural urgency and precipitation of justice that the latter 
has no horizon of expectation.” (27) Hence, the urgency of time both calls for justice and 
destroys its very horizon of accomplishment. The aporetic structure of time renders its retrieval 
impossible. Deconstruction, just like justice, is the accomplishment of that judicial aim, and 
hence is enthralled in the aporetical work of fleshing out the illegitimate yet unavoidable 
application of metaphysical logic to non-metaphysical objects.  
On the other hand, Kristeva’s approach to the retrieval of lost time is archaeological. 
Unlike deconstruction, the archaeological approach acknowledges a distinction between the mode 
of retrieval, – i.e., archaeology – , and the object of retrieval – i.e., the arché. This is not to say 
that the archaeological object may be fully retrieved as such by language, but it is to say that 
archaeology has a horizon. The horizon of archaeology is supported by the conception of 
language as well as subject-formation. Indeed, according to Kristeva, the reintroduction of the 
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previously repressed maternal drives is a break from the previous syntax and inaugurates a new 
symbolic order. The horizon may be cleared out by the psychoanalytical work on denegation and 
refusal for the subject.29 In short, the horizon of archaeology reveals itself through a radical 
acceptance by the subject of its negative foundation as lack. Any other position by the subject is 
imbued with narcissism, ego’s self-bolstering and a token of Western metaphysical thought 
(Beardsworth 2004, 40). Again, we might see some clear resemblance with Derrida’s 
deconstructive work with regards to metaphysics. However, a radical difference remains: the 
archaeological work is carried out through language and the analysis of its signifiers, because 
lack always reveals itself as such or as such – i.e., metaphorically. For example, for the subject, 
psychoanalytical work may be done through the specific metaphor of the mourning of a departed 
loved one, the acceptance of the lust for the phallus previously repressed or the independent 
distancing from a smothering parent. These are all metaphorical representation that reveals the 
symbolic necessity for semiotic work. Representation, for Kristeva, is not just the bastardized 
doubling of an originary presence; it is a second nature within which the psyche lives.  
 
4.2 Kristeva and the Problem of Agency in Subjectivity 
Sara Beardsworth argues in her Julia Kristeva (2004) that the underlying claim of Revolution in 
Poetic Language is political. According to her, a paramount goal for Kristeva’s conceptualization 
of subject-formation is to criticize bourgeois societies and answer the Marxist materialist 
dialectic (40). Bourgeois societies, for Kristeva, are structured around narcissistic fixations of the 
psyche and hence are fundamentally inflexible and foreclosed to “revolution.”30 In Revolution in 
Poetic Language, it has yet to be determined what in our twisted bourgeois societies has to do 
with a syntactic (legitimate) foreclosure of the semiotic and what has to do with a historic 
(“human-made” or illegitimate) refusal and disavowal of the thetic phase, insofar as the subject is 
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said to be “absent.” For Kristeva, significance must have a socio-historical function in order to be 
significance to be revolutionary. However, if the socio-historical function of significance may 
only arise as a break or a breaching within the narcissistic fixations of the psyche, then narcissism 
is a condition of possibility of significance itself. If narcissism is necessary for significance, how 
can it be fully fleshed out in order for significance to arise? It would seem like a Derridian 
aporetic structure reveals itself within the Kristevian framework, leading back to the very 
inaccessibility of metaphysical structure and its divorce from the symbolic dimension of 
language.  
To Kristeva’s defense, she does mention in Revolution in Poetic Language that negativity 
in itself tends to foreclose the thetic phase (Kristeva 1984, 68), which seems to provide 
delineation between what we might call a “legitimate” foreclosure of the thetic phase and an 
“illegitimate” one. Regardless, Kristeva argues that “only a subject, for whom the thetic is not a 
repression of the semiotic chora but instead a position either taken on or undergone, can call into 
question the thetic so that a new disposition may be articulated.” (51) On this point, Söderbäck 
writes, “what is at stake here is renewal, not absolute destruction. Later in Revolution in Poetic 
Language, she reminds us that while the thetic is ‘absolutely necessary’, it is nevertheless ‘not 
exclusive: the semiotic […] constantly tears it open, and this transgression brings about all the 
various transformations of the signifying practice” (Söderbäck 2011, 86f18). In order to answer 
these burning questions, I want to briefly turn to Powers of Horror (1982), which will further our 
understanding of the conditionality of revolution and ultimately consolidate our work from 
Revolution in Poetic Language. Indeed, the transformation of revolution into revolt in later texts 
will muddle the distinction between the semiotic and symbolic dimensions of language while 
preserving the radicalism of the transcendental signifying order.  
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4.3 Kristeva’s Later Conceptualization of Revolution in Powers of Horror 
Kristeva operates this transformation in Powers of Horror by reconceptualising the manifestation 
of the semiotic authority not anymore as an act – either linguistic or socio-political – but rather as 
the mapping out of bodily schema through scription.31 In short, scription is defined by Kristeva as 
“an inscription of limits, an emphasis placed not on the (paternal) Law but on (maternal) 
Authority through the very signifying order.” (Kristeva 1982, 73) This is to say that language, 
through its signifying power – which arches over both the symbolic order and its semiotic 
unfigurable dimension –, reaches out to the bodily dimension of subjectivity that is outside of 
language. However, this new bodily schema may only be understood through language as 
scription and may only be retrieved to language as archaic. Indeed, past linguistic and cultural 
rituals have inscribed the limits and the border of our symbolic order as bodily partial objects and 
are “the translinguistic spoor of the most archaic boundaries of the self’s clean and proper body 
[corps propre].” (73, my emphasis) Hence, there remains this transcendental dimension to 
language, but it is radically preceded by this archaic bodily work. Moreover, what we see in 
scription in Kristeva’s later text is partly an answer to our previous questions we have framed as 
Derridian criticism. Indeed, scription veers away from an agential handling of the semiotic 
authority by the subject through the acceptance of lack and rather inscribes this authoritative 
power of the semiotic at the level of (à même) and within the condition of possibility of 
subjectivity itself, the incorporeality of the body.  
If this new conceptualization of the semiotic order opens up a whole new theory of the 
body and its interaction with the forces of language, I rather want to quickly focus my attention 
on the subsequent modalities or conditionality of the revolt of the symbolic order unto this 
semiotic authority. As we already know from Revolution in Poetic Language, the reintroduction 
of previous repressed maternal drives in language not only shifts the symbolic order, but also 
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“introduces a new sort of rupturing conditionality for language” (Angelova 2020, 551). The 
“new” semiotic authority in Powers of Horror must underpin and support these symbolic changes 
while also giving full range to its revolution. Kristeva does so by shifting her analysis of language 
away from its (monolithic) dimensions and towards their limits, borders and interactions with one 
another. On this topic, Angelova writes, “transgressing boundaries here is especially a matter of 
processing the residual negativity of the semiotic and thus what only appears retrospectively as 
anterior to ‘limits’ and ‘borders’.” (552, my emphasis) Hence, by this shift, Kristeva operates the 
final archaical movement in understanding the retrieval of lost time. Indeed, because the limits of 
symbolic language may only reveal themselves in the I that takes into consideration or “poses” 
the Other– without the shadow of a monolithic semiotic dimension –, their force over language 
may only be released in a retrospective manner. The very retrieval of lost time may only appear 
in a retrospective manner because it may only appear when effective in the symbolic order. These 
very effects prove retrospectively the power of the symbolic order to reach out to something that 
is prior and anterior to itself – its limit with the semiotic. Furthermore, Angelova goes on, “the 
very force of conditionality of ‘binary logic’ [of the symbolic paternal and semiotic maternal] is 
anterior to the symbolic and yet in no sense pre-exists it” (552, my addition). This articulation of 
the symbolic and its conditionality of revolution further deepens the archaeological character of 
time. Indeed, the conditionality of revolution is anterior to the symbolic order precisely because it 
is its condition of possibility. However, this conditionality in no way pre-exists the symbolic 
order precisely because only the latter has the power to overturn it, by retrospectively revealing 
the effects of revolution within language. In sum, this is what I call the delayed “effect-
dependency of revolution,” which is to say that the symbolic may only be granted the efficiency 
of its revolutionary potential retrospectively, again, reinstating the importance of the symbolic 
order in revolution. Finally, this new archaic mode of retrieval of lost time is more thoroughly 
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messianic precisely because its effectivity may only be revealed in the future, in retrospect, 
effectively bringing the later Kristeva in a Derridian direction, without giving in on the 
importance of the symbolic order for revolution. 
 
5. Conclusion 
My main goal in challenging Derrida’s account of messianic time with Kristeva’s framework of 
language is to reaffirm the importance of language as a symbolic order in the philosophy of time 
and as central in operating the timely/awaited revolution in feminist philosophy. As we 
remember, this was precisely Derrida’s aim in “Force of Law”—to reimagine the locus of the 
unfolding of justice. Justice, for that matter, is played out on the grounds of the very laws, 
without referring to justice as an outside and exterior concept. Hence, any judicial aim within 
these laws must be found through a process of timely deconstruction. Moreover, the only path 
towards justice within oppressive and violent laws is a deconstructive one, which implies to 
tackle these limits of experience while grappling with the illegitimate metaphysical residue of 
that movement. At stake in this aporetic structure of experience, I argue, is for justice to have a 
“social and historical function” in experience, a phrase borrowed from Kristeva. Indeed, the 
excitability of experience at its judicial limit is the very life of experience. However, for Derrida, 
this “life” or “excitability” may not be ever recognized as such precisely because it can only 
manifest itself on the grounds of the laws and is always enthralled in the deconstructive work of 
distinguishing illegitimate application of justice and its legitimate aim.32 Furthermore, Derrida 
argues in Positions33 – a foreshadowing text of the questions at hand here – that metaphysics’ 
illegitimate application to non-metaphysical objects is the shadow of the transcendental signified 
(Derrida 1972, 41). Indeed, the shadow cast by the possibility to refer to something 
transcendentally bolsters language to an illegitimate metaphysical level and misleads experience 
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regarding its limits. This point is supported in “Force of Law,” “the injustice supposes that the 
other, the victim of the language’s injustice, is capable of a language in general […] in the sense 
that we, men, give to this world language.” (18) A central pitfall to language is its general address 
to the other, that obliterates that “justice always addresses itself to singularity, to the singularity 
of the other.” (20) Thus, language, in “Force of Law,” is essentially an unspecific address to the 
other and falls into the trap of reducing presence to representation. Although this deconstructive 
path reveals the metaphysical quandaries of our world, I argue that this relocating of justice was 
done at the expense of the symbolic order and obliterates its necessary power in feminist 
revolution. Indeed, I argue that Derrida’s differential framework is not fully suited to account for 
the specificity of the patriarchal order as an illegitimate foreclosure of temporal possibilities. 
Derrida’s framework disqualifies, in a sense, the radicality of the patriarchal order and hence 
undermines the feminist work.  
Revolution in Poetic Language gives us a shining example of how they could go hand in 
hand. To follow the same line of questioning, experience was thematized by Kristeva as 
fundamentally relating to the structure of subjectivity as lack. Indeed, the narcissistic fixities of 
the subject are partly responsible for the destructive forces at work in our world. Hence, a critical 
analysis of laws and justice must take into account the formation of subjects, the structure of the 
subjects as lack and chiefly the symbolic order that brought the subject to be with regards to their 
own lack. Indeed, for Kristeva, the metaphoricity of language allows for representation of the 
unfigurable into language to the extent that the struggle of language is played out in the subject as 
a struggle of the self. In order for the subject to accomplish this deed, the subject must seek out 
and unearth these very objects of language – metaphorically-charged – that will allow the subject 
to reaffirm itself as lack in the face of impending drives of the subject. According to Kristeva, the 
castration principle – the necessary metaphorical representation of the subject as lack – must be 
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experienced as a problem and as a tragedy by one and all in order for the semiotic to manifest 
itself and for significance to truly arise. Thus, castration is the principle of singularity in 
Revolution in Poetic Language, a principle Derrida was looking for in the unfigurability of the 
other. This is how, according to Kristeva, the question of law and justice reaches out to the field 
of subjectivity and subject-formation, previously unaddressed by Derrida.  
As my concluding remarks, I want to underline two main differences between the two 
approaches I have compared in this paper. First, a fundamental difference that I have quickly 
mentioned regards the mode of production of significance in language. Indeed, where Derrida 
looks at the originary and inaugural moments of language and law, Kristeva, through Freud, is 
rather interested in production of meaning – significance.34 For Kristeva, the conceptualization of 
the semiotic dimension of language is endorsed and proven by the capacity of language to reach 
out and produce signification. In order for language to denote and to refer to “new things” – 
however virtually (im)possible that may be –, it must be fundamentally figurable and plastic. 
Second, Kristeva has shown us that representation mustn’t necessarily live in the shadow of an 
original presence; rather representation must disentangle itself from that shadow.35 For her, this 
would mean to embrace that representation is not just the bastardized doubling of an originary 
presence, but is the second nature within which the subject lives. If the articulation of presence 
and representation is important as syntax, then the subject must have a mournful approach to the 
“original presence” in order to fully live in representation and accept itself as lack. As a matter of 
fact, the Derridian aporetic structure of representation is productive in showcasing the pitfalls of 
the application of laws towards justice. However, for Kristeva, representation must not be 
thought through the prism of its originary presence but rather in the present modes of production 
of a significant and meaningful representation. Hence, Kristeva’s psychoanalytical detour on the 
question of linguistic revolution is not a random one. Psychoanalysis does not aim, like Derrida 
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might argue, for pure agency of the subject over its conditions of possibility. It consolidates the 
subject as a hinge in meaning-production and in the unravelling of time.  
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1 For more details, see Fanny Söderbäck 2012, 304-9. 
2 Kristeva interestingly qualifies this approach of second-wave feminism as the ‘future perfect’ (Kristeva 
1981, 202), meaning that it relies on a pre-determined future in order to guide revolution, hence 
disconnecting it from the present experience and oppressions. 
3 For further details, see Söderbäck 2012, 313-20, where she thematizes the limit of language as an arché. I 
mainly draw from this text in building my account of archaeology in this paper. By archaeology, I mean a 
mode of retrieval of lost time that follows an arché. The status of the arché is one that is hidden and must 
be retrieved in order for time to unfold as such. It might take the form of a linguistic or a bodily trace or 
remainder (reste). This fundamental reste implies that the oppression and dominance of the laws of language 
may never fully repress the power of language to signify “new” things. Even though the symbolic status of 
the arché is unstable and dubious, it nonetheless constitutes a horizon for the work of time retrieval by 
representing the limit of time in language.  
4 The scope of this paper is limited to this text and its specific conceptualization of time and language. I do 
however refer and interact with other texts from Derrida to back up and refine my arguments – e.g., Derrida 
1967, 1974, 1985. 
5 Here and henceforth in this paper, I mean by “virtually” nearly possible, as in theoretically possible but 
practically impossible.  
6 To be clear, purely powerless or purely tyrannical laws are not laws per se, which is the paradox I underline 
here.  
7 Derrida uses the expression of “before the law” (Derrida 1993, 13) (Derrida 1985) to refer both (1) to being 
before the law as being prosecuted by the law and (2) to being before the law as being prior to the law.  In 
the former sense, the law as prosecutor is impenetrable to the singularly accused “subject,” in an almost 
frightening manner, just like Kafka finds this in his Before the Law. This mode of singularization through 
fright will produce “subjects” that deem law impenetrable and encourage the disconnection of the “subject” 
from its social world. In the latter sense, the anteriority to the law maintains the ambiguity with regards to 
the enforcement of the law and may refer to its legitimate founding moment. 
8 “Ungraspable” here does not mean “illegitimate.” Indeed, Derrida mentions, “the founding violence is not 
‘properly destructive’.” (52) Ungraspability can be both productive – i.e., when properly applied to justice 
– and representing a pitfall for language, as metaphysics. This second iteration could be defined as the 
consequence of the illegitimate application of metaphysical “concepts” to non-metaphysical “objects.” The 
question remains as to what will allow us to distinguish these two instances. 
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9 Hence, the quasi-ahistorical status of justice.  
10 Moreover, the structure of “Force of Law” itself is a token of that claim; in order to make his point about 
the metaphysical status of justice, Derrida chose to analyze specific cases of contemporary legal problems 
such as striking, the death penalty, war, the police, Wall Street and so on.  
11 However, what is clear in Derrida’s description of legal institutions is that there exists a virtual possibility 
of illegitimately bypassing the historicity and institutionalization of justice in its criticism. This virtual 
possibility represents the metaphysical pitfall of language.  
12 To be fair, it is not that deconstruction has no horizon, it is rather that the horizon of deconstruction is the 
horizonlessness of critical thought, or rather the deconstruction of the horizon of critical thought. 
13 This is a rewording of the previous problem of metaphysics: reiteration is not forceful in itself. Rather, a 
critical approach to forcefulness must flesh out the forcible application of reiteration. 
14 Or, as Derrida puts it in his famous French catchphrase “encore devant et devant venir.” 
15 In the same way that experience is a productive limit to justice, for example.  
16 What does Derrida mean by “man” in this excerpt? The agential subject conception of liberal societies? 
The transcendental ego of phenomenology? The subject of the symbolic order of language? If it is the latter, 
how is it that subjects may be illegitimately singularized by law – e.g., Kafka in his Before the Law? How 
may différance account for it in the mode of singularization? In short, is there a “subject” to the critical work 
for Derrida in “Force of Law”? 
17 To be fair to Kristeva, Derrida is here referring to Lacan’s concept of symbolic: “this ‘unreadable’ is also 
very much ‘illogical’ in the order of logos, and this is also why I hesitate to call it ‘symbolic’ and 
precipitately send it into the order of Lacanian discourse” (Derrida 1993, 37). The question of the similitudes 
between the law-preserving violence and Kristeva’s concept of symbolic, then, has yet to be fully answered.  
18 Julia Kristeva holds a very similar argument to mine while discussing Of Grammatology in her Revolution 
in Poetic Language (140-6). According to her, the conditions of possibility of différance is heterogeneity, 
which tacitly reproduces the metaphysical pitfall it is trying to avoid. Hence, heterogeneity becomes the 
disavowed “constitutive outside” of deconstruction. She writes, “grammatology remains silent when faced 
with its destruction and renewal” and “différance neutralizes productive negativity.” (142) I do not go as far 
in my argument. 
19 We could say that there is a différantielle contamination between presence and representation. 
20 Indeed, for Lacan, the unconscious is structured like a language, meaning that the unconscious is fully 
under the aegis of the signifier, i.e. the Phallus. However, for Kristeva, there always remains significance 
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between consciousness and the unconscious. Thus, Kristeva’s unconscious may not be fully structured by a 
signifier and significance does not fully rely upon the symbolic; there is always a remainder (reste). 
21 The subject must assume this position of absence because this is what the subject fundamentally is with 
regards to its drives, which is not to say that the subject is a slave to its own drives.  
22 Which is to say, the denotative function of language 
23 Which would lead to a Lacanian position: the inauguration of the symbolic order by the Oedipus 
complex may not be outstripped and may never be reverted. 
24 This point with be further detailed and strengthen through Beardsworth’s book. 
25 This positioning through the thetic phase will later be revealed as unstable. 
26 The liberal subject epitomizes this paradoxical position of mastery over the very unmasterable and 
metaphorical lack. 
27 Or any other “objet petit a” for Lacan, such as feet, underwear, etc. 
28 See Kristeva 1998 for a parallel between the archaeological retrieval and Proust’s literary concept of 
lost time.  
29 For further details, see Kristeva 1984, 63-4. 
30 For further details, see Beardsworth, 39-52 
31 I am indebted to Emilia Angelova’s “Abjection and the Maternal Semiotic in Kristeva’s Intimate 
Revolt” in The Philosophy of Julia Kristeva (2020) for this idea.  
32 A point with which, we have seen, Kristeva would not disagree. 
33 More specifically, “Sémiologie et Grammatologie: Entretien avec Julia Kristeva” in Derrida 1974 
34 Derrida’s point of view on Freud in “Before the Law” does not take this dimension of Freud into 
consideration, in my opinion. Indeed, for Derrida, the murder of the Father in Freud inaugurates the psyche 
and permanently institutes morality as the righteousness of the psyche (45-6). This uncritical Freudian 
approach to time is exemplified in the position of “standing upright,” which separates the nose from the 
anus and its smells. This effectively prevents Freud to sniff or trace back (flairer) the very origins of this 
moral law (38). Hence, for Derrida, Freud’s morality necessarily  amounts to a metaphysical disconnection 
from the primal (anal) drives. This is not the direction I have taken with Freud through Kristeva.  
35  Interestingly, I think, this formulation mirrors Derrida’s previous formulation of the “shadow of 
transcendental signified” in Positions (41). Again, Derrida and Kristeva’s works are closer than they seem; 
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both are trying to build a framework of language and time in order to flesh out “destructive forces” and the 
metaphysical pretentiousness of language, while also understanding that this work must cope with the 
fundamental ambiguity and metaphoricity of language. However, the question remains as to what effectively 
cast a shadow on the work of the retrieval of lost time. On the one hand, Derrida argues that entertaining 
the idea of language’s (un)attainable possibility to transcendentally signify is this shadow. Kristeva, on the 
other hand, recognizes this as an essential foundation of language – and hence, her central concept of 
significance. The shadow for Kristeva would rather be this rampant refusal of the language’s power as a 
mode of production. Interestingly, we could argue through Kristeva that Derrida’s stance on the shadow 
runs the risk of turning against itself by crystallising itself in a denegation of language’s power. The 
difference between refusal and denegation here is to be made on the level of the mode of production of 
meaning. Can this difference be an account for in Derrida’s différance? I argue in this paper that Kristeva’s 
framework is better suited to account for it.  
